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INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment and the law of defamation are two doctrines 
typically in tension with one another. While the common law tort of def-
amation allows a private citizen to sue another person and recover dam-
ages for defamatory statements, the First Amendment limits the ability of 
public officials to sue for alleged defamatory statements. But the election 
of Donald Trump presents a unique opportunity for advocates to use both 
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doctrines to promote legal protections for the press and private citizens 
alike. 
Since his election and during his presidency, Trump has launched 
numerous attacks that target the heart of the First Amendment and the 
anti-establishment principles it represents. He issued calls to loosen libel 
law restrictions when the press published negative pieces against the pres-
ident.1 He bolstered his call to weaken First Amendment protections 
against libel suits by coining the term “fake news”—a delegitimization of 
mainstream reporting with which the White House disagrees—and “alter-
native facts”—a counter-legitimization of the White House’s preferred 
version of a story.2 He restricted press access to the White House by ex-
cluding particular news agencies from certain press briefings, which 
raises concerns regarding viewpoint discrimination.3 
Yet, despite Trump’s call to expand United States libel laws to make 
it easier for public officials, like him, to bring defamation suits against 
press entities and private citizens who speak or publish against the presi-
dency or U.S. government, he continues to rely on and benefit from First 
Amendment protections as a defendant in a number of lawsuits. Summer 
 
 1 For a sample of lawsuits brought by Trump, see Mark Joseph Stern, American Bar 
Association Produces Report Calling Trump a Libel Bully, Censors It Because He’s A Libel 
Bully, SLATE: THE SLATEST (Oct. 25, 2016, 1:05 PM), https://perma.cc/MX2M-6NJR. 
 2 Compare Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Matthew Rosenberg, With False Claims, Trump 
Attacks Media on Turnout and Intelligence Rift, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/GPT7-FXGZ (Trump falsely accuses media of deliberately underestimating 
the size of the crowd at the inauguration and calls journalists “among the most dishonest hu-
man beings on earth”), and Jon Swaine, Donald Trump’s Team Defends ‘Alternative Facts’ 
After Widespread Protests, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2017, 5:25 AM), https://perma.cc/6525-SHER 
(Trump’s former press secretary, Sean Spicer, claims journalists deliberately falsely reported 
the size of the crowd of Trump’s inauguration as compared to the size of crowd of protests the 
following day, despite photographs clearly showing otherwise, and Kellyanne Conway de-
fended his characterization claiming he was only offering alternative facts), with Tim Wallace 
& Alicia Parlapiano, Crowd Scientists Say Women’s March in Washington Had 3 Times as 
Many People as Trump’s Inauguration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/5YHW-
5Z8R (reporting crowd scientists estimates of 160,000 at Trump’s inauguration and 470,000 
at the Women’s March the following day). 
 3 Sabrina Siddiqui, Trump Press Ban: BBC, CNN and Guardian Denied Access to Brief-
ing, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:49 PM), https://perma.cc/L9R7-R8TH (reporting that the 
White House handpicked several conservative news organizations and allowed them to attend 
an off-camera Q & A session, but prevented other mainstream outlets from attending); Gabri-
elle Levy, Trump Won’t Remove Press From White House, but Says He Will Pick Who Gets 
In, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://perma.cc/4WT3-ST8M (reporting that 
Trump formerly stated he would be moving the press corps out of the White House to a room 
in the Executive Office next door, and later suggested he would allow the press corps to remain 
in the Brady room, but that some of the press would not be allowed in). 
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Zervos, a former contestant on his television show, The Apprentice, ac-
cused Trump of sexually assaulting her.4 Zervos was greeted by a barrage 
of tweets from the then presidential candidate calling her a liar and stating 
that her accusations were “100% fabricated and made up charges” and 
“totally made up nonsense.”5 Zervos subsequently sued Trump for defa-
mation.6 On March 20, 2018, Trump lost his motion to dismiss the case, 
Zervos v. Trump, which was based on a defense of Presidential immunity, 
but also a First Amendment defense.7 Using the First Amendment as a 
defense, Trump attempted to argue that his tweets were “non-actionable 
rhetoric and hyperbole that is protected by the First Amendment” and 
were published as part of a “long-standing public debate,” where “the au-
dience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their 
positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole,” and what would 
ordinarily “be considered as statements of fact may well assume the char-
acter of statements of opinion.”8 The court was not persuaded, reasoning 
in its denial of Trump’s motion to dismiss that “[n]o one is above the 
law,” and even the President is not immune from liability for “purely pri-
vate acts.”9 
This, however, presents an unexamined contradiction. Trump is will-
ing to call for loosened First Amendment protections for libel laws amidst 
his allegations that the press spreads “fake news,” on the one hand, but, 
on the other hand, he simultaneously relies on the First Amendment pro-
tections against libel suits when it benefits him—when charged with sex-
ual harassment. This contradiction is concerning when considered against 
 
 4 See Molly Redden, Summer Zervos: Former Apprentice Contestant Claims Trump 
Kissed and Groped Her, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016, 5:20 AM), https://perma.cc/KMZ2-2F2N. 
 5 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2016, 3:51 AM), 
https://perma.cc/EGX9-G6FW; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 
2016, 11:29 AM), https://perma.cc/XH7V-NHFY. 
 6 Zervos v. Trump, 59 Misc. 3d 790, 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2018). 
 7 Zervos, 59 Misc. 3d at 799-800 (denying both motion to dismiss and stay of litigation). 
As of June 2018, Trump appealed the trial court decision to the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, on the grounds of presidential immunity, but the case proceeds in trial court. See 
Notice of Appeal, Zervos v. Trump, No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1, 2018). Trump 
filed an anwer where he denied most of the allegations against him and the court ordered a 
discovery schedule. See Answer at 1-8, Zervos v. Trump, No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 22, 2018); Preliminary Conference Order, Zervos v. Trump, No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. June 5, 2018). 
 8 Memorandum of Law in Support of President Donald J. Trump’s Motion to Dismiss 
and Strike the Complaint Pursuant to CPLR 3211 and Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16(B)(1) or, in 
the Alternative, for a Stay Pursuant to CPLR 2201 at 23–25, Zervos v. Trump, No. 
150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 7, 2017) (quoting Rudnick v. McMillan, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
193, 197-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 9 Zervos, 59 Misc. 3d at 795; see also Ruthann Robson, New York Judge: Trump Not 
Immune from Defamation Suit by Summer Zervos, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: CONST. L. 
PROF BLOG (Mar. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/PQ38-YUHP. 
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the backdrop of the nationalistic populism that fueled Trump’s election 
and that is ultimately embodied in what has come to be called Trumpism. 
Trumpism is an individualistic, isolated, nationalistic and American pop-
ulism that the Alt-Right has cultivated for years through the promotion of 
a propaganda-filled vision of the United States.10 This vision seeks to pro-
tect white male supremacy through the othering of immigrants and non-
citizens, Muslims, people of color, generally, Black Lives Matter, specif-
ically, Transgender and Queer communities, people with disabilities, and 
women, to name a few.11 
Before Trump’s election, and certainly after, many speculated that 
Trumpism presented a threat to the Democratic and egalitarian compo-
nents of the U.S. government.12 But the “political use of fear to justify 
repression” is not new,13 it is as much a part of our nation’s history as are 
its Democratic and egalitarian ideals. And neither the manipulation of 
facts, nor the othering of certain groups for political gain, are new phe-
nomena. “It is a seeming characteristic of American society that it is pe-
riodically gripped by fear—fear manipulated by politicians,”14 like Don-
ald Trump. 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, for example, were some of the 
U.S. government’s first official anti-immigrant legislation. The Sedition 
Act of 1798 (“Sedition Act”) made it a federal crime to write or publish 
 
 10 See Alt-Right, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CENT., https://perma.cc/6GUD-GERK (“The Al-
ternative Right, commonly known as the Alt-Right, is a set of far-right ideologies, groups and 
individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is under attack by multicultural forces 
using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white people and ‘their’ civili-
zation. The Alternative Right is characterized by heavy use of social media and online memes. 
Alt-Righters eschew ‘establishment’ conservatism, skew young, and embrace white ethno-
nationalism as a fundamental value.”). 
 11 See id.; see also Brian Resnick, Psychologists Surveyed Hundreds of Alt-Right Sup-
porters. The Results Are Unsettling., VOX (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/WHF5-
VWCC. 
 12 See John Cassidy, An Impulsive Authoritarian Populist in the White House, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/QKR7-DNQS (Trump as populist authoritarian); 
David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), https://perma.cc/PYG5-
MQSL (Trump as Autocrat); John Nichols, Donald Trump Just Summed Up His Totalitarian 
Vision for America in 4 Words, NATION (Oct. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/F3JG-QM7S 
(Trump’s vision as totalitarian); “Trump’s Only Ideology Is ‘Me’, Deeply Authoritarian & 
Very Dangerous” - Noam Chomsky, RT (May 11, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://perma.cc/S2P3-
YCTM (Trump’s ideology as deeply authoritarian); Zόcalo Public Square, What History 
Teaches Us About Demagogues Like the Donald, TIME (June 20, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/XJ4G-EYSW (Trump as populist demagogue); Zoe Williams, Totalitarian-
ism in the Age of Trump: Lessons from Hannah Arendt, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2017, 1:27 PM), 
https://perma.cc/PZ2D-CB6C (Trump’s enterprise as totalitarian). 
 13 ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE 21 (2007). 
 14 Id. at 103. 
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anything libelous against the President, Congress, or the U.S. govern-
ment, in general, or else face a fine and imprisonment.15 People often look 
to the courts for protection, but in the case of the Sedition Act, the 
“[c]ourts did nothing to restrain [their] harsh consequences” and instead 
allowed the Senate to make seditious libel a federal crime.16 When the 
First Amendment was later adopted, it was not done so to explicitly elim-
inate seditious libel as a federal crime, but some speculate that, by that 
time, the “weight of American opinion was that such a crime was incon-
sistent with constitutional values.”17 
Since its passage and subsequent doctrinal evolution, the First 
Amendment has come to embody anti-authoritarianism. Seeking protec-
tion under the First Amendment, people turn to the courts for assurance 
“that they can believe what they will and say what they believe,”18 and 
that it will be protected. Just as the U.S. government used the possibility 
of foreign threats as justification to deprive American citizens and non-
citizens’ civil liberties during the time of the Sedition Act, so too has 
Trump’s rhetoric been used to justify policy-based deprivations of civil 
liberties for Muslims, immigrants and non-citizens, people of color, mem-
bers of Transgender and Queer communities, people with disabilities, and 
women. While the First Amendment and defamation are often viewed in 
tension with one another, advocates have the opportunity to use both doc-
trines as tools in the resistance against Trumpism. 
Part I overviews the U.S. common law of defamation, as well as the 
First Amendment constitutional limitations to defamation. This section 
uses New York defamation law both to offer an example of how defama-
tion is analyzed by modern courts and as background for understanding 
how the court should analyze the defamation claim in Zervos v. Trump. 
Parts II and III present the argument that the use of both the First 
Amendment as a defense against libel suits brought by the government or 
public figures, as well as defamation torts brought against public officials, 
are opportunities to promote the press and private citizens’ speech rights. 
Part II offers a comparison between defamation law in the United King-
dom and the United States. This section provides a brief case-study of 
Irving v. Lipstadt and presents the problem of press censorship, or “libel 
chill,” when courts are tasked with the litigation of truth in public dis-
course. Part III then provides an overview of Zervos v. Trump and an anal-
ysis of how the case should ultimately be decided. 
 
 15 Sedition Act, ch. 74 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 
(1798) (expired 1801). The Alien Act also gave the president authority to deport non-citizens 
considered “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States . . . .” Alien Act, § 1. 
 16 LEWIS, supra note 13, at 106. 
 17 Id. at 21. 
 18 Id. at 106. 
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This note concludes first with a consideration of possible defamation 
suits against Trump for his allegations that mainstream news organiza-
tions report “fake news.” It then recommends that advocates use defama-
tion, and First Amendment protections against defamation, as tools in the 
resistance against Trumpism and to protect the individuals and groups 
whose civil liberties Trump attempts to deprive. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the United States, defamation exists as a cause of action and mech-
anism for recovery of damages at common law.19 Under the common law, 
defamation is “a statement that injures a third party’s reputation.”20 Def-
amation encompasses the twin torts of slander, in the case of oral com-
munication, and libel, where there is written communication.21 However, 
slander and libel are typically treated as two separate torts. 22 
The United States inherited defamation from English common law, 
yet methods of punishment and recovery for damaging another’s reputa-
tion have their roots in the Middle Ages. In the 9th Century, for example, 
“the remedy for defamation was to cut out the offender’s tongue.”23 Later 
in the Middle Ages, slander was “handled by manorial courts where the 
slanderer was required to vindicate the defamed party in front of those 
who heard the slanderous remarks,” and later fell “within the jurisdiction 
of ecclesiastical courts—which viewed defamation as a sin punishable by 
penance.”24 Actions for slander appear in common law courts in England 
as early as the 16th Century, and by the 17th Century, “the concept of 
libel also emerged in common law courts as a way of suppressing and 
criminally punishing printed political attacks.”25 
Libel and slander are still commonly recognized and discussed as 
separate causes of action. “Libel was established as a greater wrong . . . 
 
 19 1 RODNEY A. SMOLIA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:1, Westlaw (database updated May 
2018). 
 20 Defamation, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://perma.cc/XBD7-45UM. 
 21 1 SMOLIA, supra note 19, § 1:2; see also Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 444 (Iowa 
2013) (“Defamation includes the twin torts of libel and slander. Libel involves written state-
ments, while slander involves oral statements.” (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 
174 (Iowa 2004))). 
 22 The terms defamation, libel, and slander, although legally distinct concepts, are com-
monly used interchangeably, with the term libel used most often. Where legally relevant, I 
distinguish the terms, but otherwise use the terms defamation and libel interchangeably. 
 23 1 SMOLIA, supra note 19, § 1:2 (citing Collin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defa-
mation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1962) (citation omitted)). 
 24 Smith v. Durden, 276 P.3d 943, 945 (N.M. 2012) (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook 
of the Law of Torts 737 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 25 Id. (citing Prosser, supra note 24, at 738). 
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perceived as more deliberate and more malicious, more capable of circu-
lation in distant places.”26 Eventually, this distinction led not only to two 
separate causes of action, but to the development of “defamation as ac-
tionable per se or per quod.”27 Defamation per se refers to a tort of defa-
mation that can be established “without proof of harm.”28 Whereas, defa-
mation per quod “is not defamatory on its face,” and so requires “extrinsic 
facts” “to prove its defamatory nature before recovery is allowed.”29 
A. Constitutional Limitations on Defamation Law in the United States 
Under federal constitutional law, defamation is limited by First 
Amendment doctrine.30 Any present-day defamation suit is limited and 
influenced by these constitutional principles, even though common law 
defamation, including the torts of libel and slander, predates the First 
Amendment. 
1. New York Times Company v. Sullivan: Articulating the Public 
Figure “Actual Malice” Standard 
Defamation is in doctrinal tension with First Amendment speech and 
press freedoms.31 Defamation posits that private citizens and public offi-
cials ought to be able to recover from another person or a news organiza-
tion for reputational damage and actual harm, whether physical, eco-
nomic, or emotional, caused by the other entity’s spoken or written 
speech. This is, however, at odds with the primary function of free speech 
under the First Amendment, which is to promote the free exchange of 
ideas where the speaker can say and think what they want, no matter how 
unpopular or offensive, without fear of governmental reprimand and con-
trol.32 
 
 26 Id. (quotation omitted). 
 27 Id. (emphasis added). 
 28 Id. (citation omitted). 
 29 Id. (citation omitted). 
 30 1 SMOLIA, supra note 19, § 1:1; see also Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defama-
tion Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 
1349 (1975). 
 31 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (“Some tension necessarily ex-
ists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in re-
dressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated, ‘some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech 
and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaran-
teeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy.’” (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130, 152 (1967))). 
 32 FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 5 (2013) (“[T]he central concern of the First Amendment is the danger of gov-
ernment control over what is thought and what is said. It is not just that the First Amendment, 
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In its landmark case, New York Times v. Sullivan (“New York 
Times”), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed for the first time the consti-
tutionality of common law defamation. In New York Times, L.B. Sullivan, 
a public figure, brought a libel action against the New York Times.33 Sul-
livan’s libel claim conflicted with the New York Times’ First Amendment 
speech and press protections.34 In New York Times, the Court held that a 
public official, public figure, or person running for public office can re-
cover damages for defamation only by proving with clear and convincing 
evidence the falsity of defamatory statements and the presence of actual 
malice in the speaker.35 Actual malice includes either intent or knowledge 
that the statement was false or amounts to a reckless disregard of the 
truth.36 Practically speaking, when a public figure alleges that a private 
citizen, news organization, or any publishing entity publishes a statement 
(libel) or says a statement (slander), the public figure may only sue that 
entity if the entity acted with actual malice. This rule highlighted the First 
Amendment’s promotion and protection of the free and unencumbered 
exchange of ideas: a defamation action, or even the threat of a defamation 
action, by any public official, particularly against a newspaper or press 
entity, limits the press entity’s willingness to freely exchange controver-
sial ideas. The actual malice standard created a higher burden for defama-
tion actions brought by public officials, and in turn, the limitation pro-
motes the First Amendments’ protection of the free exchange of ideas. 
The Court decided New York Times in the height of the Civil Rights 
Movement. In the early 1960s, L.B. Sullivan, who supervised the local 
police department as an elected Commissioner of the City of Montgom-
ery, Alabama, brought a libel action against the New York Times, as well 
as four Black clergymen in Montgomery. Sullivan alleged that he had 
been libeled by an advertisement printed in the newspaper regarding the 
non-violent student organizing movement taking place in the Deep 
 
like the rest of the Bill of Rights, applies only to acts of the government. It is that it is, at its 
core, a protection against government. That, surely, is what Jefferson had in mind when he 
wrote that a bill of rights was ‘what the people are entitled to against every government on 
earth.’ It is what Justice William O. Douglas meant when he observed that ‘[t]he struggle for 
liberty has been a struggle against government.’ And it is what Justice Robert Jackson, in a 
typically felicitous phrase, conveyed in stating that ‘[t]he very purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through 
regulating the press, speech, and religion.’”) (alterations in original). 
 33 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 284-86. 
 36 Id at 280. 
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South.37 The advertisement mentioned the Montgomery Police and con-
tained a variety of undisputed inaccuracies within its text.38 Sullivan 
asked the New York Times to retract the advertisement, claiming that it 
amounted to a libelous statement against him, pursuant to the Alabama 
law that “denies a public officer,” like Sullivan, “recovery of punitive 
damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication concerning 
his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a public 
retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply.”39 
When the New York Times did not publish a retraction, Sullivan 
sued in an Alabama court a few days later. The case went before a jury, 
and the judge instructed the jury that the statements in the advertisement 
were “libelous per se,” because “the law . . . implies legal injury from the 
bare fact of publication itself, falsity and malice are presumed, general 
damages need not be alleged or proved, but are presumed, and punitive 
damages may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual 
damages is neither found nor shown.”40 The jury found for Sullivan.41 
Before giving the jury instruction, the trial judge refused to consider the 
New York Times’ argument that the judge’s instructions violated freedom 
of speech and the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment.42 The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment in its en-
tirety.43 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, stating that “the rule of law 
applied by the Alabama courts [was] constitutionally deficient for failure 
to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are 
required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought 
by a public official against critics of his official conduct.”44 First, the 
Court explained that the state action threshold required for any claim 
brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied in an ac-
tion for defamation;45 although defamation suits are technically civil law-
suits between two private entities, one party brings the action for recovery 
 
 37 Id. at 256-57. 
 38 Id. at 258-59. 
 39 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 261. 
 40 Id. at 262 (quotation marks omitted). 
 41 Id. at 262-63. 
 42 Id. at 263. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 264. 
 45 State action is the threshold requirement for all constitutional claims, with the excep-
tion of those brought under the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery. The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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against another relying on state defamation laws, so state action is estab-
lished for any challenge to the constitutionality of the application of a 
defamation law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.46 
Next, the Court considered “the case against the background of a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials,” and so concluded that the First Amend-
ment protects certain speech made against public officials.47 The Court 
explained, “[a]uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guar-
antees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of 
truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative offi-
cials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the 
speaker.”48 There is a historical risk, the Court reasoned, in placing limi-
tations on any form of dissenting statement citizens and the press can 
bring against public officials, even if those statements are factually inac-
curate, and “constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”49 Thus, the 
Court held that “the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award dam-
ages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their 
official conduct.”50 
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Defining the General Purpose and 
Limited Purpose Public Figure 
A decade later, the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
(“Gertz”) clarified the meaning of public figure for the purpose of the New 
York Times actual malice standard. In Gertz, the Court held that states can 
define the appropriate standard for liability under defamation for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster that produces a defamatory false statement that in-
jures a private individual.51 But, the Court also clarified that while a 
heightened actual malice standard is required when a defamatory state-
ment is made against a public figure, it broadened the definition of public 
 
 46 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 265. 
 47 Id. at 270 (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 48 Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). 
 49 Id. at 280. 
 50 Id. at 283-90. 
 51 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974). 
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figure: (1) those who achieve pervasive fame and notoriety for all pur-
poses (“general purpose public figures”), and (2) those who voluntarily 
enter or are drawn into a particular public controversy and act as a public 
figure for a limited range of issues (“limited purpose public figures”).52 
In the words of the Court, a general purpose public figure is someone who 
has “achieve[d] such pervasive fame or notoriety” or “such pervasive 
power and influence” that that person “becomes a public figure for all 
purposes and in all contexts.”53 A limited purpose public figure, in con-
trast, is “an individual [who] voluntarily injects” or thrusts himself, or is 
involuntarily “drawn into a particular public controversy” “in order to in-
fluence the resolution of the issues involved” and “thereby becomes a 
public figure for a limited range of issues.”54 
The petitioner in Gertz was an attorney in a civil action for the family 
of a young man who was shot and killed by a Chicago police officer.55 
The respondent published a monthly publication titled “American Opin-
ion,” which contained the views of the John Birch Society. The John 
Birch Society was, at the time, attempting to “warn of a nationwide con-
spiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies and create in their 
stead a national police force capable of supporting a Communist dictator-
ship.”56 The magazine published a story that contained serious inaccura-
cies, claiming without a basis that Gertz had a criminal record, was a 
“Leninist” and a “Communist-fronter,” and had “been an officer in the 
National Lawyers Guild,” which the magazine misidentified as a com-
munist organization and inaccurately alleged that it planned an attack on 
the Chicago police.57 After Gertz sued for defamation, the respondent-
magazine claimed First Amendment privilege, arguing that Gertz was a 
public figure, so could not succeed under the heightened actual malice 
standard.58 The Court disagreed with the respondent, and eventually con-
cluded that Gertz was not a public figure because he had not “thrust him-
self into the vortex of [a] public issue, nor did he engage the public’s at-
tention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”59 
The Court used this case to clarify the meaning of public figure, and 
held that parties who are not public figures for all purposes may still be 
public figures with respect to a particular controversy.60 When the Court 
 
 52 Id. at 345. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 345, 351. 
 55 Id. at 325. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26. 
 58 Id. at 327-28. 
 59 Id. at 351. 
 60 Id. at 352. 
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broadened the public figure category in Gertz, it also broadened First 
Amendment protections for the press against defamation suits because, 
after Gertz, either general or limited purpose public figures must meet the 
heightened actual malice standard. 
3. Common Law Defamation Today: Libel and Slander in New 
York 
Common law defamation, encompassing the twin torts of libel and 
slander, varies jurisdiction by jurisdiction. New York defamation law of-
fers one example of how modern courts analyze an action for libel or slan-
der and provides a background for how the court in Zervos v. Trump, dis-
cussed below, should analyze Summer Zervos’s defamation suit against 
Trump. 
In New York, the torts of libel and slander are categorized as per-
sonal injuries.61 The courts of New York apply two different standards, in 
line with the constitutional limitations outlined in New York Times and 
Gertz, to evaluate a claim for a defamatory statement, either through libel 
(written communication) or slander (oral communication). There is one 
standard for a plaintiff who is a private citizen and another for a plaintiff 
who is a public figure. 
If a plaintiff is a private citizen, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove 
five elements to succeed on a libel or slander claim: 
(1) A written (libel) or spoken (slander) defamatory statement 
about the plaintiff; 
(2) Unauthorized publication to a third party; 
(3) Fault (negligence at a minimum for private citizens, compared 
with actual malice for public figures); 
(4) Falsity of the defamatory statement; and 
(5) Special harm to the plaintiff’s reputation or defamation per 
se.62 
 
 61 N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 37-a (McKinney 2018) (“‘Personal injury’ includes libel, 
slander and malicious prosecution; also an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other ac-
tionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another.”).  
 62 Mitre Sports Int’l. Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 240, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (citing Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters, Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 
also Accadia Site Contracting, Inc. v. Skurka, 129 A.D.3d 1453, 1453 (4th Dep’t 2015) (quot-
ing D’Amico v. Corr. Med. Care, Inc., 120 A.D.3d 956 (4th Dep’t 2014)); CHRISTINE M. G. 
DAVIS ET AL., 43A N.Y. JUR. 2D Defamation & Privacy § 6, Westlaw (database updated May 
2018). 
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“When statements fall within established categories of per se defama-
tion,” however, “the law presumes that damages will result, and they need 
not be alleged or proven.”63 Moreover, there are four exceptions to the 
general requirement that a plaintiff establish that they suffered “special 
harm” to their reputation: (1) statements that charge a plaintiff with a se-
rious crime; (2) statements that injure a person’s trade or business; (3) 
statements that allege a plaintiff has a “loathsome disease;” and (4) state-
ments “imputing unchastity to a woman.”64 
If, however, the plaintiff is a public figure, the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of satisfying the heightened “actual malice standard,” which replaces 
the elements mentioned above for private citizens with the four elements 
listed below to succeed on a claim for either libel or slander. The public 
figure plaintiff must show that: 
(1) The alleged statements were about and concerning him; 
(2) That they were likely to be understood as defamatory by the 
ordinary person; 
(3) That the statements were false; and 
(4) That they were published with actual malice.65 
While the Supreme Court articulated that a general purpose public 
figure is someone who has “general fame or notoriety in the community 
and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society,” and that a limited 
purpose public figure is someone who has “thrust themselves to the fore-
front of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution 
of the issues involved,”66 the Second Circuit has also articulated a test for 
determining when someone is a limited purpose public figure. Typically, 
a defendant will allege that the plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure 
to encourage the court to apply the heightened actual malice standard in 
the defamation suit. To prove that the plaintiff is a limited purpose public 
figure, the defendant must show the plaintiff has: 
(1) Successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort 
to influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of liti-
gation; 
 
 63 Zherka v. Amicone, 634 F.3d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 64 “There are ‘four established exceptions [to the requirement that plaintiff allege special 
damages] consist[ing] of statements (i) charging plaintiff with a serious crime; (ii) that tend to 
injure another in his or her trade, business or profession; (iii) that plaintiff has a loathsome 
disease; or (iv) imputing unchastity to a woman.’” Id. at 645 n.6 (quoting Liberman v. Gel-
stein, 80 N.Y.2d 429 (1992)). 
 65 Curry v. Roman, 217 A.D.2d 314, 318 (4th Dep’t 1995). 
 66 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324, 345, 352 (1974). 
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(2) Voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related 
to the subject of the litigation; 
(3) Assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy; 
and 
(4) Maintained regular and continuing access to the media.67 
When determining whether a plaintiff is a limited purpose public fig-
ure, courts may also consider other factors, like whether the plaintiff has 
“taken affirmative steps to attract personal attention or [has] strived to 
achieve a measure of public acclaim,” and whether or not that personal 
attention or acclaim is actually achieved.68 
II. ENGLISH DEFAMATION LAW AS A CASE STUDY 
A. Trump’s Vision of Loosened Libel Laws in the United States 
Considered Against the Impact of Censorship and Libel Chill on 
English Defamation Law 
Trump has called repeatedly for loosened libel restrictions. During 
his campaign, he argued that defamation law in the United States ought 
to be more like libel law in the United Kingdom where, according to him, 
“you can actually sue if someone says something wrong.”69 Based on in-
terviews and additional statements, it appears that Trump’s current under-
standing of defamation law in the United Kingdom, and his vision for 
loosened libel protections in the United States is as follows: 
Our press is allowed to say whatever they want and get away with it. 
And I think we should go to a system where if they do something 
wrong . . . I’m a big believer, tremendous believer, of the freedom of the 
press. Nobody believes it stronger than me, but if they make terrible, ter-
rible mistakes and those mistakes are made on purpose to injure people. 
I’m not just talking about me, I’m talking anybody else then, yes, I think 
 
 67 Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 68 Mitre Sports Int’l. Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 240, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (citing James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 422 (1976)). 
 69 David Bixenspan, Trump Gives Rambling Answer About Press Freedoms in Miami TV 
Interview, LAW & CRIME (Oct. 24, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://perma.cc/QW7B-DJW7 (statement 
of Donald Trump). Although England, the United Kingdom, Great Britain and Britain are 
sometimes used interchangeably when discussing defamation law in the United Kingdom, I 
discuss defamation law as it is applied under the current legal system in the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (“United Kingdom”), which includes the common law 
systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. See Legal Research Guide: 
United Kingdom, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://perma.cc/9BZY-8MDF. When I do not use the 
term United Kingdom, I use the terms England or English common law because the law of 
defamation derives from the English common law. 
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you should have the ability to sue them . . . . [I]n England, you have a 
good chance of winning. And deals are made and apologies are made. 
Over here they don’t have to apologize. They can say anything they want 
about you or me and there doesn’t have to be any apology. England has a 
system where if they are wrong, things happen.70 
There are a number of primary differences between defamation law 
in the United States and English defamation. In the United Kingdom, once 
a plaintiff sues a defendant for libel or slander, the burden is on the de-
fendant to prove that they did not libel or slander the plaintiff. Further, to 
recover for libel in the United Kingdom, “plaintiffs need only show that 
the press or media made defamatory statements that referred to them or 
that reasonable people would regard as referring to the plaintiffs.”71 While 
the “media and press do have a privilege of fair comment,” “the scope of 
this right is severely limited” and “protects only assertions of opinion, and 
not assertions of fact.”72 In contrast, in the United States, the burden is on 
the plaintiff to either demonstrate harm, or in the case of a public figure 
plaintiff, actual malice. Under English defamation law then, it is far easier 
for plaintiffs (who may be public figures) to recover against defendants 
(who are frequently press entities) than it is in the United States. It is not, 
however, easy for defendants in the United Kingdom to win. The differing 
international standards for libel in the United States and United Kingdom 
have created a legal phenomenon known as “libel tourism” where a plain-
tiff brings a lawsuit in a country where it is likely to win, like in the United 
Kingdom.73 
One criticism of English libel law is that where the defendant (often 
a press entity) bears the burden of proof, it exposes the press to near con-
stant and expensive litigation, which has a chilling effect on the substance 
of what is reported and what is not.74 This effect is commonly called “libel 
chill.”75 Libel chill creates a fear of impending litigation, which subse-
quently limits the public’s “access to information that would properly in-
form their decision-making on important topics, such as public health and 
safety, or about the conduct of powerful corporations.”76 
 
 70 Bixenspan, supra note 69 (first omission in original) (statement of Donald Trump). 
 71 Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual Malice” Stand-
ard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1162 (1993). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Ari Shapiro, On Libel and the Law, U.S. and U.K. Go Separate Ways, NPR (Mar. 21, 
2015, 7:11 AM), https://perma.cc/G78U-J7QC. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Allen Green, Banish the Libel Chill, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2009, 12:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/YY8H-DRGG. 
 76 Id. 
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In expressing his desire for U.S. libel laws to be more similar to those 
in the United Kingdom, Trump is likely hoping for the following: (1) for 
the burden to be placed on the defendant to prove the truth of their alleg-
edly defamatory statements; (2) for there to be no comparable free speech 
protection when the plaintiff is a public figure and the defendant is the 
press, and so the press is exposed to a near constant threat of litigation; 
(3) for the press to have a “privilege of fair comment” that would only 
apply to opinions, not facts, meaning that any allegation of “fake news” 
or “alternative facts” could be used as fodder for a defamation lawsuit; 
and (4) for state courts to be tasked with evaluating the truth or falsity of 
a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements. 
The Supreme Court has already expressly spoken to its concern 
about libel laws that do not prioritize freedom of expression and public 
discourse. As discussed above, the Court explained in New York Times, 
“[a]uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have 
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth.”77 
There is a historical risk, the Court reasoned, in placing limitations on any 
forms of dissenting statement citizens and the press can bring against pub-
lic officials.78 The purpose of these First Amendment protections in the 
United States is to combat against the threat of libel chill, and to promote 
the free and unencumbered exchange of ideas, no matter how unpopular. 
B. David Irving v. Penguin Books & Deborah Lipsadt: English Courts 
as a Site for the Litigation of Truth 
Case law in the United Kingdom offers a glimpse of what it might 
look like if libel laws were loosened in the United States. When “the bur-
den of proving truth [is] on the speaker,” regardless of the topic and no 
matter how seemingly historically contested, courts are required to eval-
uate the truth or falsity of the alleged defamatory statement. This often 
puts courts on a difficult path of historical interpretation. Courts in Eng-
land are routinely tasked with this activity and must carefully balance 
their evaluation of the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement with the 
truth or falsity of the facts underlying the allegedly defamatory statement. 
An example of how an English court handles this task is found in David 
Irving v. Penguin Books & Deborah Lipsadt (“Irving”).79 In Irving, the 
court was required to evaluate whether Deborah Lipsadt’s book, Denying 
the Holocaust, which charted the history of the Holocaust Denial Move-
ment, was defamatory toward Holocaust Denier, David Irving. 
 
 77 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)). 
 78 See id. at 271-73. 
 79 Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., [2000] EWHC (QB) 1996-I-1113 (Eng.). 
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Deborah Lipsadt is a Jewish-American historian who is known for 
authoring the book, Denying the Holocaust.80 In Denying the Holocaust, 
Lipstadt extensively researched and wrote about the history of the Holo-
caust Denial Movement, naming David Irving, among others, as a Holo-
caust denier.81 Irving produced numerous works that many scholars con-
sidered historically revisionist; Irving claimed that the Holocaust did not 
happen, arguing, for instance, that Hitler did not know of the extermina-
tion of the Jews or, if he did, opposed it.82 Irving sued Penguin Books, the 
publisher of Denying the Holocaust,83 and Lipstadt for libel over Lip-
stadt’s allegedly defamatory statements calling Irving a Holocaust de-
nier.84 The court summarized the issues in the case as follows: 
Irving complains that certain passages in the Defendants’ book ac-
cuse him of being a Nazi apologist and an admirer of Hitler, who has 
resorted to the distortion of facts and to the manipulation of documents in 
support of his contention that the Holocaust did not take place. He con-
tends that the Defendants’ book is part of a concerted attempt to ruin his 
reputation as an historian and he seeks damages accordingly. The Defend-
ants, whilst they do not accept the interpretation which Irving places on 
the passages complained of, assert that it is true that Irving is discredited 
as an historian by reason of his denial of the Holocaust and by reason of 
his persistent distortion of the historical record so as to depict Hitler in a 
[favorable] light. The Defendants maintain that the claim for damages for 
libel must in consequence fail.85 
The court made a special effort to specify that “the context in which 
these issues fall to be determined is one which arouses the strongest pas-
sions,” so noted that it was important to “stress at the outset of this judg-
ment that [the court does] not regard it as being any part of [its] function 
as the trial judge to make findings of fact as to what did and what did not 
occur during the Nazi regime in Germany.”86 Even though the court at-
tempts to make clear that it is not analyzing the truth of the facts underly-
ing the case—whether or not the Holocaust happened—in a way, the court 
 
 80 DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST (2013). 
 81 See id. 
 82 Irving authored many books regarding “the events of and leading up to the Second 
World War” and is a specialist in “the history of the Third Reich.” Irving v. Penguin Books 
Ltd., [2000] EWHC (QB) 1996-I-1113 (Eng.). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id.; see also Dennise Mulvihill, Comment, Irving v. Penguin: Historians on Trial and 
the Determination of Truth Under English Libel Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP., 
MEDIA & ENTM’T. L.J. 217 (2000). 
 85 Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., [2000] EWHC (QB) 1996-I-1113, [1.2] (Eng.). 
 86 Id. at [1.3]. 
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could not avoid doing this, because the truth or falsity of that fact is de-
terminative of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement made 
against the Holocaust Denier, David Irving. 
The court investigated the supposedly defamatory statements made 
in the book and evaluated whether or not the statements had a defamatory 
meaning. Ultimately, the case proceeded through a long trial, where the 
court was required to review a substantial body of historical evidence to 
determine if Lipstadt defamed Irving. The burden of proof was on Lip-
stadt and Penguin Books to prove the claims were true. The judge even-
tually ruled that Lipstadt succeeded in proving nearly every claim she as-
serted except for two claims.87 That Lipstadt and Penguin Books won was 
no small feat, especially considering they had the burden of proving the 
truth of the statements in Denying the Holocaust.88 This lawsuit demon-
strates the difficult position that courts are put in when they are tasked 
with evaluating the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement. 
C. Fake News and Alternative Facts: Imagining Loosened Libel Laws 
Amidst Allegations Against the Press and Alternative Facts 
Irving, in particular, demonstrates the importance of facts and how 
to effectively “fight for the truth in an era marked by ‘alternative facts.’”89 
Courts in the United States are not put in as difficult of a position as courts 
in the United Kingdom when it comes to evaluating the truth or falsity of 
a statement. This is because the burden is on the plaintiff in the United 
States to make out the elements of a defamation tort—generally, that a 
defamatory statement was made or published, that it was false, and that it 
caused a special harm, or in some cases per se defamation. Assuming a 
plaintiff does make out these elements, the court or jury must still ulti-
mately determine whether to believe the truth of the facts that the plaintiff 
alleges. 
If a court, whether in the United States or United Kingdom, is ulti-
mately tasked with evaluating a defamation claim based on the facts al-
leged, then what is a court to believe if a public figure categorizes main-
stream media reporting as “fake news,” and then claims that an alternative 
version of the story is supported by “alternative facts”? Trump has 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Forum shopping is an issue in England, but also libel laws in England may be slowly 
liberalizing: Jameel v. Wall St. Journal, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 74 (Eng.). 
 89 Deborah Lipstadt: Behind the Lies of Holocaust Denial, TED (Apr. 2017), 
https://perma.cc/QRE8-KJ7P. 
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launched repeated attacks against the veracity of mainstream news report-
ing,90 and has also favored Alt-Right or right-leaning news organizations 
over more mainstream news organizations.91 This calls into question what 
facts a court can, or should, rely on when a public figure like Trump 
spreads a nationalistic rhetoric that consistently accuses reputable news 
companies of lying, frequently without basis, and then promotes an alter-
native version of the facts as the truth. 
III. ZERVOS V. TRUMP 
The court in Zervos v. Trump should find that Trump defamed Sum-
mer Zervos and can do so within the limits of the First Amendment. In 
the present case, Trump offers as a defense to defaming Summer Zervos, 
after she accused him of sexual assault and harassment, an admission that 
making defamatory statements is common practice in public discourse. 
The court need look no further than Trump’s own defamatory statements 
to find in favor for Zervos. 
In January 2017, Summer Zervos, a former contestant on Trump’s 
reality television show, The Apprentice, sued Trump in New York state 
court for defamation.92 Zervos previously came forward and accused 
Trump of kissing and groping her, once at his New York office and then 
again at a Beverly Hills hotel, where he “placed his hand on her breast,” 
tried to lead her into a hotel room, and after she resisted his advances, 
“press[ed] his genitals against her” while trying to kiss her.93 Zervos de-
cided to come forward about Trump’s sexual misconduct because she felt 
 
 90 In remarks made at the Conservative Political Action Conference, Trump decried “fake 
news ‘the enemy of the people,’” claiming that the mainstream news organizations CBS, ABC, 
and NBC conducted polls prior to the election that were either inaccurate or illegitimate. Don-
ald Trump, Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7V76-FHAP. Trump has also frequently criticized the New York Times, la-
beling the entire publication “fake news.” Rebecca Morin, Trump Criticizes ‘Fake News’ New 
York Times, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://perma.cc/P6MC-T6FL. 
 91 Although he recently left the position, Trump initially hired as his Chief Strategist, 
Steve Bannon, former executive chair of the Alternative Right (Alt-Right) news company, 
Breitbart News. Breitbart News has been criticized for lacking support for many of the extreme 
positions that it publishes on its website. Trump has also limited press access and apparently 
privileged certain news agencies over others, which lends to the theory that Alt-Right-leaning 
news organizations may evolve into a privatized version of state-sponsored media. Matthew 
Ingram, Why Breitbart News Will Be the Closest Thing to a State-Owned Media Entity, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/XJ7H-6YWC. 
 92 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Zervos v. Trump, No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Jan. 17, 2017). 
 93 Zervos v. Trump, 59 Misc. 3d 790, 792 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2018); see also Com-
plaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Zervos v. Trump, Index No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Jan. 17, 2017); Molly Redden, Summer Zervos: Former Apprentice Contestant Claims Trump 
Kissed and Groped Her, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016, 5:20 AM), https://perma.cc/KMZ2-2F2N. 
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that it “was ethically the right thing to do” and “so that the public could 
evaluate Mr. Trump fully as a candidate for president.”94 
Trump made numerous statements denying her allegations and 
claiming their falsity on his campaign website, at a campaign rally, at a 
presidential debate,95 and also on the social media platform, Twitter, in 
which he called her a liar, and said the allegations were “100% fabricated 
and made-up charges” and “totally made up nonsense.”96 At a campaign 
rally in Pennsylvania, Trump also said: “Every woman lied when they 
came forward to hurt my campaign, total fabrication. The events never 
happened. Never. All of these liars will be sued after the election is 
over.”97 Zervos alleged that Trump’s repeated statements about her, in-
cluding his statement that the description of the sexual assault was a lie, 
amounted to defamation against her.98 
Zervos cited to numerous statements made by Trump and reported 
by the media, in addition to his Twitter feed throughout his campaign. 
Zervos stated in her complaint that Trump’s “defamatory statements 
clearly identified Ms. Zervos,” and that they were “defamatory per se.”99 
The statements were “published throughout New York and across the 
country” in part because Trump “ensured that his statements would be 
widely disseminated by sending them out over Twitter himself,” and that 
Trump “made the statements knowing they were false or recklessly dis-
regarding their truth or falsity.”100 Zervos alleged that she suffered emo-
tional harm and economic damage, “including reduced income and reve-
nue at her restaurant.”101 
In July 2017, Trump moved to dismiss the complaint.102 In his re-
quest for dismissal, or at least a stay pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 
2201 for the duration of his presidency, Trump argued that the court may 
 
 94 Zervos, 59 Misc. 3d at 793. 
 95 Id. at 793-94. 
 96 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2016, 3:51 AM), 
https://perma.cc/EGX9-G6FW; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 
2016, 11:29 AM), https://perma.cc/XH7V-NHFY; see generally Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, Zervos v. Trump, Index No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2017). 
 97 Zervos, 59 Misc. 3d at 794. 
 98 This is one of about 75 lawsuits pending against Trump right now. See Nick Pen-
zenstadler, Trump Claims Immunity From ‘Apprentice’ Contestant’s Lawsuit, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ 
(Mar. 28, 2017, 1:03 PM), https://perma.cc/LU4F-TXVF. 
 99 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Zervos v. Trump, Index No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2017). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Memorandum of Law in Support of President Donald J. Trump’s Motion to Dismiss 
and Strike the Complaint Pursuant to CPLR 3211 and Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16(b)(1) or, in 
the Alternative, for a Stay Pursuant to CPLR 2201, Zervos v. Trump, No. 150522/2017 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. July 7, 2017). 
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not exercise jurisdiction over the complaint at all, or at least during his 
presidency, because he is protected from suit under the doctrine of presi-
dential immunity.103 While a sitting president cannot be sued for civil 
damages in federal court unless those acts are “non-official,”104 it is not 
clear that a president is immune from civil lawsuits over private interests 
in state court. 
Trump then presented a First Amendment defense, arguing that the 
statements, “all of which were advanced during a heated political cam-
paign to convince the public to vote for Mr. Trump, and many of which 
were published via Twitter—constitute non-actionable rhetoric and hy-
perbole that is protected by the First Amendment.”105 Trump reasoned 
that since the “First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent applica-
tion’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office,”106 when 
“potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate . . . in 
which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade oth-
ers to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole,” what 
would ordinarily “be considered as statements of fact may well assume 
the character of statements of opinion.”107 The statements against Ms. 
Zervos, Trump argued, should be seen as part of the “longstanding public 
debate” Trump had engaged in “with the media and his opponents on a 
host of matters, including his qualifications to run for office.”108 Trump 
even argued that the forums selected for the potentially defamatory state-
ments—”the official campaign website, campaign rallies, a presidential 
debate, and President Trump’s Twitter account”—were all “forums the 
audience understands robust political debate will be conducted in, albeit 
in an informal manner.”109 Trump then used a First Amendment defense 
 
 103 “[T]he Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution prevents this State Court 
from hearing this action, whatever its merit or lack thereof, against a sitting President.” Id. at 
2. “[A] state court cannot exercise direct control or ‘retard, impede, burden, or in any manner 
control’ the Executive Branch by compelling the President to submit to its jurisdiction, includ-
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to bolster his argument that his statements about Zervos were either opin-
ions, and thus non-actionable, or did not refer to Zervos specifically, and 
were thus non-actionable.110 In support of his arguments, Trump attached, 
among other documents, copies of Tweets and various news articles 
throughout the Presidential campaign.111 
On March 20, 2018, the court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on 
both the theory of presidential immunity and also declined to stay the lit-
igation during the remainder of his presidency.112 The court disposed of 
Trump’s arguments that presidential immunity protected him from liabil-
ity for defamation in state court, proclaiming “[n]o one is above the law” 
and that “[i]t is settled that the President of the United States has no im-
munity and is ‘subject to the laws’ for purely private acts,” and that “there 
is absolutely no authority for dismissing or staying a civil action related 
purely to unofficial conduct because defendant is the President of the 
United States.”113 
The court briefly addressed the underlying defamation claim to con-
clude that the complaint could not be dismissed for failure to state a cause 
of action because Zervos’s complaint was “based on assertions made” by 
Trump that, “if proven false, form the predicate for a maintainable defa-
mation action.”114 If and when the court reaches the merits of the case, it 
should analyze the case applying New York libel law, which has also 
adopted First Amendment constitutional principles. First, the court will 
determine whether Zervos is a limited purpose public figure to determine 
whether a negligence or actual malice standard of fault applies to Trump. 
The constitutional standard for determining when someone is a limited 
purpose public figure is whether they have “thrust themselves to the fore-
front of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution 
of the issues involved.”115 
There is a strong argument that Zervos did not “voluntarily inject” 
herself into the public controversy—the sexual assault claims against 
Trump—because she did not choose to be assaulted by Trump. She, fur-
thermore, did not “maintain regular and continuing access to the media” 
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simply because she filed a lawsuit—in fact, she made very few press ap-
pearances prior to or following the suit.116 The court could find otherwise, 
reasoning that she assumed a position of public prominence when she ap-
peared on The Apprentice. 
If Trump cannot prove that Zervos was a public figure, then the court 
will evaluate the case under a negligence standard, meaning because Zer-
vos is considered a private citizen, she will have to prove five elements to 
succeed on a claim for libel: (1) a written defamatory statement; (2) un-
authorized publication to a third party; (3) fault; (4) falsity of the defam-
atory statement; and (5) special harm to her reputation.117 In New York, 
“[w]hen statements fall within established categories of per se defama-
tion, the law presumes that damages will result, and they need not be al-
leged or proven.”118 Zervos appears to allege facts sufficient for each of 
these elements. She indicates that Trump’s defamatory statements clearly 
identified her, that they were “defamatory per se,” and that they were 
published across the country, in part because Trump posted them to his 
Twitter account. Zervos also alleged that she suffered emotional harm and 
economic damage, “including reduced income at her restaurant.”119 Since, 
however, she only alleges that the statements were knowingly made and 
that they were “false” and he recklessly disregarded the truth, it is unclear 
if her claim would survive if it were analyzed under actual malice without 
more facts. The court, however, should not analyze the claim under an 
actual malice standard because Zervos is neither a general purpose or lim-
ited purpose public figure. 
When it denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, the court also rejected 
Trump’s First Amendment defense that his statements were mere hyper-
bole, opinion, or part of public debate, reasoning that Trump’s repeated 
statements were “delivered in speeches, debates and through Twitter, [one 
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of Trump’s] preferred means of communication,” and the fact that they 
were made while he was campaigning for the presidency did “not make 
them any less actionable.”120 It is telling that Trump’s assertion that his 
defamatory tweets were merely rhetoric and hyperbole dismissed the ve-
racity of Zervos’s claim: that Trump forcibly kissed and groped her with-
out her consent, continued to pressure her to come to his hotel room, and 
then repeatedly kissed and forcibly touched her despite her protests, 
which amounts to sexual harassment and sexual assault in most jurisdic-
tions.121 To assert the public debate defense in earnest, Trump had to al-
lege that his repeated statements that Zervos was lying were only hyper-
bole and should not be taken seriously. This is another way of saying that 
Trump’s defense here is that his statements, as president-elect, and maybe 
even as president, should not always be taken seriously. 
So, should the court believe that when Trump called Zervos a “liar,” 
he was only engaging in rhetoric, which means that Trump does not deny 
sexually assaulting Zervos? Or should the court believe that the sexual 
assault did not happen in order to reach the conclusion that Trump could 
not have defamed Zervos? Like the English court in Lipsadt, the court 
here will likely take the position that it is not in the business of evaluating 
whether or not the sexual assault happened (or in Lipsadt whether or not 
the Holocaust happened) to determine if Trump’s tweets were defama-
tory. Even so, Trump’s defense implies just that—that the sexual assault 
did not happen, so his comments about Zervos were just part of public 
debate. 
Trump is defending himself in a defamation suit by saying that his 
fiery rhetoric is just part of public discourse, so he cannot be taken seri-
ously, and is thus deserving of First Amendment protection. Yet, he has 
repeatedly alleged that the public ought to accept his administration’s “al-
ternative facts” as true and should reject the mainstream media’s “fake 
news” as false. Ultimately, these contradictions call into question 
Trump’s credibility, in general, and raise the question of what, if anything, 
that Trump says in public discourse can be taken as true, particularly if a 
court is required to analyze a defamation action where Trump is either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Press should sue Trump for defamation when he alleges that 
mainstream news organizations report “fake news.” While Donald Trump 
has called for looser First Amendment restrictions to American libel 
 
 120 Zervos v. Trump, 59 Misc. 3d 790, 799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2018). 
 121 Rudnick v. McMillan, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 197-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
2018] DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT  283 
law,122 which would make it easier for public figures, like him, to sue the 
press for defamation, First Amendment lawyers may consider another 
possibility: the press could sue Trump for defamation against the press 
based on his repeated attacks and unfounded allegations that many main-
stream news entities are publishing “fake news.” Some have noted that 
Donald Trump “may be the greatest threat to the First Amendment since 
the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798.”123 
[It] seems to be that in light of the attacks made by then-Candidate 
Trump against the press on a continuing basis—his preventing 
certain journalists from even attending his rallies as part of the 
press corps because he disapproved [of] their writing, and his pub-
lic comments about wanting to loosen American libel law—the 
press ought to be thinking broadly about how to defend itself if 
his Administration turns out to be as antagonistic to the press as 
may be the case . . . . We do have libel law . . . . It may well be 
necessary to think outside the box in response to a deliberately 
repressive Administration . . . . It’s because the level of hostility 
to the press, and perhaps the willingness to limit or punish press 
criticism may reach a new height in this Administration . . . . The 
press is used to defending libel cases . . . My plea is to bear in 
mind that one of the potential weapons is that when anyone—
president or shoemaker—defames an entity, and speaks falsely 
and maliciously, one of the possible responses is to bring a libel 
suit.124 
Whether such a suit would be successful depends on the circumstances 
surrounding the defamatory speech alleged. 
The denial of Trump’s motion to dismiss in Zervos is encouraging 
for the press and any advocate who wants to hold the president accounta-
ble. Ultimately, the press and advocates can and should consider the use 
of both defamation and First Amendment protections against defamation 
as tools in the resistance against Trumpism and the deprivations of civil 
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liberties that Trump has advocated that target Muslims, immigrants and 
non-citizens, people of color, members of Queer and Transgender com-
munities, people with disabilities, and women. In this moment, amidst 
allegations of fake news and unsupported alternative facts by our nation’s 
top official, the First Amendment and the anti-authoritarianism ideals it 
embodies are important as ever. The press and people should turn to the 
courts for assurance, that speech and dissent are appropriate mechanisms 
for holding the president accountable, and that such speech will be pro-
tected. At the same time, the press and citizens could also turn to the 
courts using the law of defamation to hold the president and other public 
officials accountable for spreading harmful rhetoric against women and 
other targeted groups, and for accusing the press of reporting “fake news.” 
The First Amendment and defamation can both play an important role in 
the protection of free speech and the promotion of truth and accountability 
under Trump. 
